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Resolutions of necessity in eminent domain: 
City of Stockton v Marina Towers.  2009 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Eminent Domain: Post-resolution events do not cure inadequate resolution of necessity. 
City of Stockton v Marina Towers LLC (2009) 171 CA4th 93, 88 CR3d 909 
 
The City of Stockton issued resolutions of necessity for a vacant office building and land 
owned by Marina Towers LLC near a redevelopment area. The resolutions were framed in the 
conclusory terms of the statute and did not specify a particular project for which the condemned 
property would be used. Marina Towers objected and claimed that the city had interfered with 
Marina Towers’ development negotiations. The city obtained immediate possession. By the time 
the case came to trial, the city had built a parking lot and a baseball field on the two parcels 
taken. The trial court relied on the post-resolution uses of the property to validate the resolutions 
of necessity and awarded compensation for the acquisition of the property, but rejected the claim 
for damages for unreasonable precondemnation activities. The court of appeal reversed the trial 
court judgment and remanded to the trial court for a conditional dismissal on just terms, 
including Marina Towers’ reasonable litigation expens s. 
The court of appeal held that a resolution of necessity must specify the public use for which 
acquisition is sought under CCP §1245.230. That use was not specified by the city’s vague 
resolutions and could not be specified after the fact by subsequent events. Otherwise, there could 
be no reasoned determination of the city’s right to condemn the property. Thus, Marina Towers’ 
objection had merit, the city’s complaint in eminent domain was defective, and its action had to 
be dismissed. However, that dismissal may be conditi ed on remedial action ordered by the 
court. CCP §1260.120. It was undisputed that the city had constructed public use projects on the 
property. An unconditional dismissal would produce a windfall to Marina Towers in the value of 
the improvements made by the city. Under CCP §1260.120(c) and City of Lincoln v Barringer 
(2002) 102 CA4th 1211, 1233, 126 CR2d 178, the dismis al may be made conditional on 
corrective and remedial action ordered by the court. The court of appeal did not reach the 
remaining issues, including valuation of the property. The court of appeal reversed the judgment 
and remanded to the trial court for conditional dismissal on such terms as are just, including an 
award of litigation expenses to Marina Towers. If the city passes new resolutions of necessity, an 
amended complaint must be filed and the case tried de novo. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: This decision should be called the case where “Kelo Came Home 
to Roost.” Its primary purpose, I think, is to warn local governments that they cannot just 
take private property because of some uncertain (or ulte ior) motive and get away with it by 
hiding behind boilerplate clichés about noble but meaningless civic goals. (This strong 
language is not mine; the court’s characterization of the city’s actions was “nondescript, 
amorphous,” “vague, uncertain and sweeping,” “woefully lacking,” “global yet evasive,” 
“hopelessly obscure,” “inscrutable and meaningless”—adjectives all apparently concocted 
and applied by it in the face of the trial court’s upholding of the project.) 
Yet despite that array of insults, the city is clearly going to be allowed to have its ballpark 
and parking lot. An unconditional dismissal in favor of the owners was denied, and the 
eminent domain proceedings were only conditionally dismissed, leaving no doubt that the 
project—since it is now obviously capable of concrete definition—will be upheld on 
remand. 
The publication of this iron-fist-and-silk-glove opinion tells me that it was not written as 
much for the officials of Stockton as for those employed in all the other local government 
agencies that have eminent domain authority. The lesson for them is that the courts will be 
watchful and that they cannot ride roughshod over th  landowners’ objections to the taking 
of their properties; there will be serious judicial review of the “public use” that is asserted as 
the motivation. (Although it is much less explicitly stated in the opinion, there may also be 
close oversight of any subsequent turnover of the property to another private party or, when 
the local redevelopment agency is also involved, whether the asserted “blight” truly exists.) 
The noisy public reaction to Kelo has been heard by the judges. 
Nor is the judicial threat one of mere rebuke. Stockt n’s public parking lot may stand, but 
it will cost the taxpayers. All of the costs of the litigation, both trial and appeal, including 
attorney fees, plus possible consequential damages, ar  going to be recovered by these 
defendants. That may be a strong disincentive for planners to be profligate and an equally 
strong incentive for landowners—and their attorneys—to fight back. 
—Roger Bernhardt 
 
